A Dissent on Joint Custody by Singer, Jana B. & Reynolds, William L.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 2 Article 9
A Dissent on Joint Custody
Jana B. Singer
William L. Reynolds
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jana B. Singer, & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Md. L. Rev. 497 (1988)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/9
Article
A DISSENT ON JOINT CUSTODY
JANA B. SINGER*
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS"
Joint custody is sweeping the country. In 1975 only one state
had a statute providing for joint custody; today, well over half do,
and "[recent laws have become increasingly preferential toward
joint custody."' Mostjoint custody statutes allow a court to impose
joint custody even if one parent objects to it.2 And an increasing
number of statutes establish a legislative preference for joint cus-
tody or a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of
the children.' Even in states without joint custody statutes, courts
have invoked their "inherent" authority to award joint custody.4
Two years ago, Maryland jumped on the joint custody band-
wagon. In Taylor v. Taylor' the Court of Appeals held that courts of
equity had the power to award joint custody if doing so would "ac-
complish the paramount purpose of securing the welfare and pro-
moting the best interest of the child." 6 Moreover, the court ruled
that neither a couple's lack of agreement, nor one parent's objection
to joint custody, should disable ajudge from exercising this power.7
We have serious reservations about joint custody, particularly if
it is court-imposed. The Taylor decision, unfortunately, encourages
its use. Worse, the opinion raises the possibility that joint custody
could be awarded over the opposition of one parent, or even both.
And worse may follow. Last year, the General Assembly considered
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1. Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinkingjoint Custody, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 455, 456 n.3 (1984); see
Folberg,Joint Custody Law-The Second lI'ave, 23J. FAM. L. I, 1 (1984).
2. See Folberg, supra note 1, at 14-55 (from chart).
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
5. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
6. Id. at 302, 508 A.2d at 970.
7. See id. at 307-08, 508 A.2d at 972-73.
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legislation that would have created a presumption in favor of joint
custody.8 Although that legislation was defeated, it is clear that
joint custody has acquired momentum in this state.
This paper first analyzes the Taylor decision. It then examines
the arguments advanced by joint custody advocates. We conclude
that these arguments are supported neither by data nor by common
sense. We also examine other problems with joint custody arrange-
ments, particularly arrangements imposed by courts. Finally, we de-
scribe briefly the "primary caretaker preference," and suggest that
Maryland seriously consider adopting this method of resolving cus-
tody disputes.
I. THE TAYLOR DECISION
The marriage of Judith and Neil Taylor produced two children
and lasted not quite five years. After the couple began experiencing
marital difficulties, Judith left the marital home and moved to New-
ark, Delaware. Neil then filed for divorce in Maryland, seeking cus-
tody of the children; Judith, in her answer, also sought custody.9
The trial court eventually ordered a "sort of joint custody," which
seems, in fact, to have been an order awarding custody to the fa-
ther."° The Court of Special Appeals affirmed," and the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari.
The court began by discussing generally the concept of joint
custody, noting that there was no consensus as to the meaning of
the term. The court observed that "custody" really has two compo-
nents: "legal" and "physical" custody. Legal custody is "the right
to make long range decisions on matters of major significance con-
cerning the child's life and welfare." Physical custody, in contrast, is
the right and duty "to provide a home for the child and to make the
day-to-day decisions required during the time the child is actually
with the parent having such custody."' 2 Having split the concept of
custody into its two components, the court held that "[piroper prac-
tice in any case involving joint custody dictates that the parties and
8. S.B. 277, Md. Gen. Assembly, 393d Sess. (1987). This bill was defeated,
although a portion of it, unrelated to joint custody, was enacted. See Act of May 14,
1987, ch. 337, 1987 Md. Laws 1914 (codified at MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 9-104
(1987)). Two similar bills were introduced during the 1988 legislative session. See S.B.
404, H.B. 892, Md. Gen. Assembly, 394th Sess. (1988).
9. 306 Md. at 294, 508 A.2d at 966.
10. The "primary residence of the children" was to be the former marital home. Id.
at 295, 508 A.2d at 966.
11. 60 Md. App. 268, 482 A.2d 167 (1984).
12. 306 Md. at 296, 508 A.2d at 967.
498 [VOL. 47:497
DISSENT ON JOINT CUSTODY
the trial judge separately consider the issues involved in both joint
legal custody and joint physical custody, and that the trial judge
state specifically the decision made as to each."' 3
After analyzing the relevant statutory and case law, the court
concluded that a court of equity had power to award joint custody if
doing so would secure the welfare and promote the -best interest of
the child. 4 After a brief discussion of the benefits and drawbacks
associated with joint custody, the court held that "when appropri-
ate, joint custody can result in substantial advantage to children and
parents alike, and the feasibility of such an arrangement is certainly
worthy of careful consideration."' 5 That award can be made even
over the objections of one parent. 16 Moreover, the court's opinion
makes clear that judges in Maryland may award joint legal custody,
without joint physical custody.
The court then turned to the considerations that should enter
into the decision whether to award joint custody. After summariz-
ing cases from several other jurisdictions, the court set forth a long
list of factors that the trial judge should consider before making an
award. 7 The factors listed by the court are so broad and so capable
of manipulation that the decision on joint custody obviously has
been committed to the sound discretion of the trial judges.'8
Although the court cautioned against awarding joint cu-;tody on a
13. Id. at 297, 508 A.2d at 967.
14. Id. at 301-02, 508 A.2d at 969-70.
15. Id. at 303, 508 A.2d at 970.
16. Id. at 307-08, 508 A.2d at 972-73.
17. These factors, not listed in order of priority, arci as follows:
(1) capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions
affecting the child's welfare;
(2) willingness of parents to share custody;
(3) fitness of parents;
(4) relationship established between the child and each parent;
(5) preference of the child;
(6) potential disruption of child's social and school life;
(7) geographic proximity of parental homes;
(8) demands of parental employment;
(9) age and number of children;
(10) sincerity of parents' request;
(II) financial status of the parents;
(12) impact on state or federal assistance; and
(13) benefit to parents.
Id. at 302-11, 508 A.2d at 970-74.
The court added a fourteenth consideration-"Other Factors." Only the first of
the listed factors generated any significant discussion.
18. This is particularly true because Maryland appellate courts will not reverse cus-
tody awards made by trial judges unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See
McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 9, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1978).
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"[b]lind hope that [it] will be successful,"' 9 that certainly remains a
very real possibility.
II. THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY
Advocates ofjoint custody believe that an impressive number of
benefits result from its use. On their face, these arguments make a
strong case.
First, the child benefits from having "meaningful relationships
and frequent contact with both psychological parents." 0 This com-
mon-sense observation is confirmed by a number of studies.2' Re-
search shows that children adjust better to divorce if they have
frequent contact with both parents, a process hampered by the ten-
dency of the noncustodial father to withdraw following divorce.
22
Joint custody, by ensuring continued contact with the father, coun-
teracts this tendency and thus promotes the child's welfare. 23 Advo-
cates like to quote the statement from Wallerstein - and Kelly,
prominent child development experts, that "divorcing parents
should be encouraged and helped to shape post-divorce arrange-
ments which permit and foster continuity in the child's relations
with both parents. 24
Second, joint custody benefits the parents. The court in Taylor
focused heavily on this benefit.25 Parents in successful joint custody
situations feel better about themselves, about each other, and, as a
19. Taylor, 306 Md. at 307, 508 A.2d at 972.
20. Blond, In the Child's Best Interests-A Better Way: The Case for Presumptive Joint Custody
in Missouri, 52 UMKC L. REV. 567, 586 (1984).
2 1. See generally Clingempeel & Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and
Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 102 (1982).
22. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 1, at 489 (and sources cited therein). These
findings are regarded as contradicting the theory, prominently espoused in J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 35-37 (2d ed.
1973), that sole custody is best for the development of the child. See Blond, supra note
20, at 582-84. In the 1979 "Epilogue" to Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, the authors
make clear that they do not oppose joint (physical) custody, as long as one parent has
the legal authority to determine the relationship. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 116-21 (2d ed. 1979).
23. Blond, supra note 20, at 595-98 (listing a number of supposed benefits to the
child: increased I.Q.; better "socialization"; less bewilderment; fewer loyalty conflicts;
and a lessening of the feeling of loss and rejection).
24. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY' SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PAR-
ENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 311 (1980). In a subsequent article, Wallerstein expressed
strong opposition to both presumptive and court-imposed joint custody. See infra note
47.
25. 306 Md. at 306-07, 508 A.2d at 972.
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result, they feel better about the child.26 The child can only benefit
from that improvement.2"
Joint custody is also touted as a solution to the child support
problem. The data on this problem are appalling. The failure of
fathers to pay any, much less adequate, child support is a national
disgrace. Some believe that at least part of the explanation lies in
the fact that divorced fathers lack significant contact with their chil-
dren under sole custody arrangements. Sharing custody, it is
hoped, will encourage fathers to pay more regularly.28
Joint custody is also said to reflect modern changes in parental
roles. Today's fathers spend more time with their children; today's
mothers spend more time in the workplace. Joint custody is thought
to be a proper way of reflecting modern reality and ensuring that
custody decisions are not based on outmoded gender stereotypes. 29
Finally, joint custody is said to ease judicial administration. A
preference in favor of joint custody avoids the detailed inquiry nec-
essary to determine the best interests of the children in each con-
tested custody case. Where both parents are reasonably fit,
determining who will make the "better" custodian is often time-con-
suming and difficult. Somejudges simply are not well-suited, either
by training or by temperament, to make this kind of decision. Joint
custody makes easier the life of such a judge3 0
Moreover, the certainty provided by a widespread regime of
joint custody will tend to reduce litigation (and relitigation), thus
decreasing costs to the parties and the judicial system.3' And joint
custody may also help alleviate some of the terrible uncertainty par-
ents (and children) must feel as they await the decision of the
court .3
These arguments have had a dramatic impact on custody law.
Indeed, commentators have described the rise of joint custody as a
26. Canacakos,joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 785, 787 (1981)
(going so far as to argue that a parent has a constitutional right to joint custody).
27. A sole custody award, in contrast, "isolates children from their fathers and forces
mothers into the work force." Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. LJ. 271, 275 (1978-79).
28. See Comment, The Unfulfilled Promise ofJoint Custody in Montana, 48 Morrr. L. REV.
135, 138 (1987).
29. Proponents also claim, somewhat inconsistently, that joint custody avoids penal-
izing fathers who, because of their traditional role as family breadwinner, spend more
time away from home. Bratt, supra note 27, at 276.
30. See Blond, supra note 20, at 569-70.
3 1. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 1, at 69-70.
32. See id. at 470. A reduction in litigation would help prevent children from being
Ireated as courtroom pawns.
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"small revolution . . . in child custody law." 33 The basis for this
revolution, however, is highly questionable.
III. AN EVALUATION OF JOINT CUSTODY
None of the arguments advanced by proponents of court-im-
posed or presumptive joint custody is persuasive. First, proponents
of court-imposed joint custody use the term "joint custody" to
cover several-quite different types of custody arrangements. Most
important, they fail to distinguish joint physical custody from joint
legal custody, in which the child resides primarily (or exclusively)
with one parent-usually the mother-while the nonresidential fa-
ther retains joint decisionmaking authority over the child's upbring-
ing.3 4 Most "joint custody" arrangements-and virtually all court-
imposed joint custody decrees-fall into the latter category.35 This
latter category closely resembles the traditional maternal-custody-
with-liberal-paternal-visitation arrangement with one essential, dif-
ference: it accords the nonresidential father almost all of the rights
but few of the responsibilities that raising a child entails.
Second, joint custody proponents make an unjustified leap
from the common sense proposition that children do better after
divorce if they maintain frequent contact with both parents to the
startling conclusion that joint custody is the only way to ensure such
contact. Neither logic nor data support this leap.
Third, virtually all of the studies relied upon by joint custody
proponents involve voluntary rather than court-imposed joint cus-
tody arrangements; the limited success of voluntary arrangements
simply does not support the imposition of joint custody on parents
who oppose it. Moreover, the studies indicate that even voluntary
joint custody arrangements produce significant risks for children,
and create serious problems for both divorced parents and the judi-
cial system.
The possibility of court-imposed joint custody also introduces
significant distortions into the judicial process. Awarding joint cus-
tody, particularly joint legal custody, affords judges an easy and fair-
sounding "fix" for resolving difficult custody disputes. It creates the
illusion of equality and Solomonic wisdom and improperly allows a
33. Id. at 455.
34. For a discussion of the continued prevalence of mothers as the primary custodial
parent, see infra part Ill D and text accompanying notes 74-75.
35. Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Impli-
cations for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 538, 542-43 (1982).
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judge to avoid making a difficult-but often necessary-choice be-
tween two seemingly fit parents.
Finally, proponents of joint custody presumptions fail to con-
sider the detrimental effect of their proposals on the already lop-
sided process of divorce bargaining. Proponents ignore what
studies increasingly confirm: divorcing husbands routinely and suc-
cessfully use the threat of a custody fight to reduce or eliminate ali-
mony and child suppbrt obligations. The success of such "custody
blackmail" has been identified as a major cause of the impoverish-
ment of divorced women and their children.3 6
A. The Critical Distinction Between Joint Physical Custody
and Joint Legal Custody
Proponents use the label "joint custody" to cover a multitude
of quite different post-divorce custody arrangements. in particular,
they fail to distinguish letween joint legal custody and joint physical
custody, and they have attempted to appropriate the benefits of
both types of arrangements, while ignoring the shortcomings of
each. More important, proponents have failed to acknowledge that
the vast majority of court-ordered joint custody decrees provide for
equal parental rights, but impose vastly unequal parental responsibili-
ties. Joint legal custody denotes parents' equal authority, or legal
right, to make the vital decisions affecting a child's life. "7 Joint phys-
ical custody refers to the approximately equal parental sharing of
physical care and living time with the child-that is, to equal custo-
dial responsibilities.3 8
Most joint custody arrangements, and virtually all court-im-
posed joint custody decrees involve joint legal custody only. 9 The
36. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTiON 310-12 (1985); Neeley, The Primary
Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168,
168-69 (1984). A brief discussion of the questionable legal ethics of custody blackmail
can be found in Crouch, The M'atter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of Defining
Unethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 FAM. L.J. 413, 416 (1986).
37. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 35, at 542.
38. Id. Joint physical custody does not necessarily entail an equal sharing of parental
responsibilities. For example, the proposed 1987 Maryland joint custody bill provided
that joint physical custody "includes an arrangement under which each of the parents or
parties enjoy significant periods of time in which the child resides with or is under the care
and supervision of each of the parents or parties." S.B. 277, Md. Gen. Assembly, 393d
Sess. (1987) (emphasis added). Similarly, California's joint custody statute provides:
" 'Joint physical custody' means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of
physical custody. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way so
as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents." CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4600.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
39. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 35, at 543; see also L. WEITZMAN, supra note 36, at
19881 503
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children in such arrangements live with and are primarily cared for
by one parent-usually the mother. The nonresidential parent-
generally the father-enjoys liberal visitation rights, just as he does
in most traditional sole custody arrangements. The critical differ-
ence is that under joint legal custody the nonresidential father also
enjoys equal legal authority to control the child's upbringing.40
This means that he must concur in-or at least not object to-all
major decisions affecting the child's life. Thus, the nonresidential
father has most of the privileges but few of the day-to-day responsi-
bilities of raising a child. Conversely, the residential mother loses
muclg of the decisionmaking authority generally enjoyed by other
adults who assume the day-to-day responsibilities of caring for
children.
Joint legal custody thus severely restricts the ability of the par-
ent with whom the child lives to make significant decisions affecting
both her life and the lives of her children. In essence, it gives the
nonresidential father veto power over most major decisions regard-
ing the health, education, and upbringing of children who are not in
his physical care. Such veto power may be acceptable if both parents
agree to it and are committed to making the arrangement work. To
subject a nonconsenting physical custodian to such an arrangement,
however, invites chaos and offends well-established principles of pa-
rental autonomy. 4
253-54; Raines,Joint Custody and the Right to Travel- Legal and Psychological Implications, 24
J. FAM. L. 625, 626-27 (1985-1986) ("Under most joint custody statutes, there exists no
requirement that the parents share their children's time equally, but only that the chil-
dren's time be divided between the parents 'in such a way so as to assure a child of
frequent and continuing contact with both parents.' "); Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark &
Whitney, An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements: Joint Versus Sole Legal Custody, 11 J. Psy-
CHIATRY & L. 419, 425, 440 (1983) (finding that, in a study of 500 Massachusetts di-
vorces, 90% of all "joint custody" awards involved joint legal custody only) [hereinafter
Empirical Study].
40. See, e.g., Folberg, Custody Overview, inJoiNT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 7 (J.
Folberg ed. 1984) ("The distinguishing feature ofjoint custody is that both parents re-
tain legal responsibility and authority for the care and control of the child, much as in an
intact family. Joint custody upon divorce is defined here as an arrangement in which
both parents have equal rights and responsibilities regarding major decisions and
neither parent's rights are superior.").
41. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the right of parents to make deci-
sions concerning the rearing of children in their care is of constitutional dimension.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n. 12 (1977) (plurality opinion).
See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[C]onstitutional interpreta-
tion has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own house-
hold to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."). See
generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state cannot require members of the
Amish Church to send their children to public school after the eighth grade); Meyer v.
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Joint legal custody also impairs the ability of the physical custo-
dian to choose where she and her children will live. Joint custody
decrees commonly restrict geographical moves with the child, par-
ticularly out of state.42 Courts generally enforce such restrictions
unless the physical custodian is able to prove that a proposed move
is in the child's best interest, a difficult burden to meet in light of the
strong preference in most joint custody states for the continued
proximity of the child to the nonresidential parent.43 Many joint
custody decrees also provide that if the parent with physical custody
moves without court approval, sole custody will automatically vest in
the other parent.4 4 Significantly, no such restrictions apply to
moves by the nonresidential parent, despite his status as joint legal
custodian and even though a move by him may disrupt significantly
the joint custody arrangement. Nor is there any way to force a joint
legal custodian (or any other nonresidential parent) to exercise his
right to "frequent and continuing contact" with his children, even if
he remains in the same locale as the physical custodian. Once again,
joint legal custody affords a nonresidential parent many privileges
and a significant measure of control over his former spouse, but few
parental obligations or responsibilities.
B. The Logical Leap
Joint custody proponents rely heavily on the common-sense as-
sertion that children do better after divorce if they maintain mean-
ingful contact with both parents.45 But simply calling something
"joint custody" is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure this con-
tact. Traditional sole custody arrangements with liberal visitation
provide ample opportunity for the noncustodial parent to have sig-
nificant contact with the child, if that parent chooses to stay in touch.
Indeed, the study that proponents cite most frequently in support of
their "meaningful contact" claim examined only sole custody ar-
rangements. 46 As that study demonstrates, parents who are com-
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law forbidding the use of any language other than
English to teach any child who has not passed the eighth grade was unconstitutionally
violative of parents' liberty right under fourteenth amendment to control education of
their children).
42. Folberg, supra note I, at 8-11.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 9-10. Such a punitive rule completely ignores the best-interests-of-the-
child doctrine.
45. See Blond, siupra note 20, at 586.
46. See id.
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mitted to sharing childrearing responsibilities after divorce do not
need a joint custody order.
Nor does joint custody-particularly joint legal custody-guar-
antee continuing parental involvement. Neither the child nor the
physical custodian can force a nonresidential parent to stay in-
volved. Indeed, there simply is no reason to believe that anything
short of "true" joint physical custody will necessarily increase par-
ent-child contact after divorce. Joint custody proponents cite no
data to back up their continuing involvement claim, nor do they ex-
plain why the interested noncustodial parent cannot increase con-
tact under a sole custody arrangement.
C. The Data
Despite the popularity of "joint custody" as a legal concept, few
empirical studies have actually examined how joint custody works in
practice.4" The studies that do exist fail to support either court-im-
posed or presumptive joint custody. First, virtually all the studies
invoked by proponents of court-imposed joint custody involve vol-
untary joint custody arrangements, that is, joint custody arrange-
ments initiated and agreed upon by the parties outside of court.
The success of self-initiated arrangements (assuming they are suc-
cessful) tells us little about the likely success or potential benefits of
court-imposed joint custody. Parents who agree voluntarily, outside
of court, to share custody of their children after divorce are gener-
ally highly motivated and cooperative, at least when dealing with
their children. To extrapolate from the success of these voluntary
arrangements to the desirability of imposing joint custody on par-
ents who oppose it is both factually and logically flawed; it is
equivalent to suggesting that the benefits associated with a healthy
marriage justify court-imposed marriages regardless of "spousal"
consent.
Moreover, in the only study which included a sample of joint
custody arrangements that were ordered or strongly influenced by a
47. See Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 21, at 103-04 ("Methodologically defen-
sible studies focusing directly on the advantages of joint versus single-parent custody
are virtually nonexistent."); Stahl, A Review ofJoint and Shared Parenting Literature, inJOINT
CUSTODY AN) SHARED PARENTING, 25, 35-36 (J. Folberg ed. 1984) ("In contrast to the
expanding amount of writing about joint custody, there have been few formal research
projects designed to study joint custody and its possible effects on families."); Waller-
stein, Children of Divorce: An Ovenuiew, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCi. & L. 105, 106 (1986) ("An
extensive review of joint custody research calls attention not only to the paucity of re-
search altogether in ihis important public domain, but specifically to the very limited
knowledge about the key figure of the child in the joint custody arrangement.").
506 (VOL-. 47:497
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court, none of the families with court-imposed or court-influenced
joint custody was found to be "successful" one year after the ar-
rangement began.48 Indeed, the authors concluded that "the de-
gree to which the court influenced the joint custody arrangement
was negatively related to outcome."49 In light of this evidence, it is
hardly surprising that the leading clinical researchers of the children
of divorce are unhappy with court-ordered or presumptive joint
custody.50
The limited number of studies relied upon by joint custody pro-
ponents have other serious methodological shortcomings. First, the
studies concentrate almost exclusively on middle class parents who
were early joint custody enthusiasts, hardly a representative
group.5' Second, the studies are largely descriptive and the number
of families involved in each study is too small to produce any gener-
ally applicable conclusions.5 2 Moreover, the available research gen-
erally lacks control groups and is based largely on interviews
(mostly with parents) as the primary data source.53 Several of the
most frequently cited studies are limited to interviews of parents
(sometimes of fathers only); the children's adjustment to the joint
custody arrangement is discerned only through parental reports.5 4
In addition, most studies indicate that even voluntary joint cus-
tody arrangements produce mixed results. There is some evidence
that joint custody arrangements result in more child-related relitiga-
48. Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody
Following Divorce: lW'ho Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court,
24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554, 558 (1985).
49. Id.
50. See. e.g., Emery, Hetherington & Dilalla, Divorce, Children and Social Policy, in I
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 189, 225-26 (H. Stevenson & A. Siegel eds.
1984) (concluding that "joint custody does not appear to be the solution to the indeter-
minacy confronting judges who hear custody disputes"); Wallerstein, supra note 47, at
106 ("There is, in fact, no body of scientific knowledge that supports either a presump-
tion ofjoint custody or the imposition of joint physical custody over the objection of one
parent.").
51. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note I, at 484.
52. TwifordJoint Custody: .4 Blind Leap of Faith?, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 157, 163-65
(1986).
53. The absence of control groups confirms that the families most likely to be in-
volved in joint custody are the ones identified (either by themselves or by judges) to
have the greatest chance for making it work. Nevertheless, the data does not show joint
custody to be a very successful option.
54. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 1, at 484; Wallerstein, supra note 47, at 106. For a
general discussion of the difficulties and dangers of using social science data in the for-
mulation of custody rules, see Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policrmaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 124-39.
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tion than sole custody decrees. 55 This is hardly surprising--one in-
escapable consequence of joint custody is that two people who are
no longer married to each other must concur in most major deci-
sions affecting a child's life. The potential for disagreement is enor-
mous, and the incentive to "work out" those disagreements within
the post-divorce family may be minimal:
Under joint custody every decision, no matter how minor,
can be argued and fought. Joint custody gives sanction to
parents who file application after application with the
courts because they cannot agree about the littlest aspect
affecting the lives of their children. Joint custody, unlike
sole custody, legitimizes those applications and then ex-
pects our judiciary to take on the role of parent. In addi-
tion, the children witness and become part of the litigation
process, viewing themselves as the root of those
hostilities.5 6
Several real life examples demonstrate the force of these con-
cerns. In one situation, parents with joint custody enrolled their
children in two separate schools. The children attended a parochial
school during the two weeks each month they resided with one par-
ent and a public school during the other two weeks. When the chil-
dren attended one school, they were truant from the other. They
were failing in both schools and traumatized psychologically, yet
each parent was exercising his or her "rights" under a joint custody
decree.5 7
In another, more life-threatening, situation a hospital refused
to perform surgery on a child with joint legal custodians because
while one parent consented to the procedure, the other parent re-
fused consent. The hospital was forced to summon a judge to order
the surgery. Fortunately, the judge reached the hospital before the
55. See Empirical Stud)y, supra note 37, at 436. But see lifeld, lfeld & Alexander, Does
Joint Custody Wlork? .4 First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62
(1982) (finding that exclusive custody awards are more litigated than joint custody
awards). The latter study, however, involved a smaller sample and different sampling
techniques; moreover, it found relitigation of court-ordered joint custody to be at the
same rate as for custody relitigation generally. Id. at 64-65.
56. SkoloffJoint Custody: .4 Jaundiced View, TRIAL, Mar. 1984, at 52, 53-54.
57. See Levy & Chambers. The Folly ofJoint Custody, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1981, at 6, 8
(discussing Griffin v. Griffin, 699 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1985)). Because the parents could not
agree on a school for the child, the Griffin court let the mother decide; it held that the
agreement with respect to schools was unenforceable. The court noted that enforcing
such an agreement "exposes the child to further discord and surrounds the child with an
atmosphere of hostility and insecurity." Griffin, 699 P.2d at 410.
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child's appendix ruptured.58
Research also indicates that joint custody arrangements may be
stressful for children. This is particularly true of joint physical cus-
tody, in which the children typically shuttle back and forth from one
parental residence to the other. A 1981 study of twenty-four fami-
lies with voluntary joint custody arrangements found that one-third
of the children experienced significant loyalty conflicts. 59 More-
over, one quarter of the children expressed confusion and anxiety
about moving between two homes. They worried about themselves,
their parents, and their possessions, and they showed an overall
sense of instability.60 The author concluded that although the par-
ents in her sample were committed to joint custody, the children's
experience was not wholly satisfactory and that the arrangement was
not suitable for all children.6 She also found, in a one-year follow-
up study, that about one-third of the families eventually shifted to
an arrangement in which the child lived primarily with one parent.6 2
Another study of twenty-five voluntary joint custody families
found that joint custody did not lessen the stress of divorce for
young children. Instead, the authors concluded that children in
joint custody were "indistinguishable in their initial distress and
early responses to marital rupture from their counterparts in sole
custody arrangements. 6 3 In particular, the joint custody children
were acutely aware of the marital separation and of conflict between
their parents.' The authors concluded that parents who hope joint
custody will spare their children the pain of divorce "will be
disillusioned." 6 5
Moreover, joint custody offers many possibilities for manipula-
tion. Flexibility of living arrangements enhances the child's ability
58. See Levy & Chambers, supra note 57, at 8.
59. Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a
Study, 51 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 409 (1981).
60. Id. at 410.
61. Id. at 414.
62. Steinman.Joint Custody: What We Know, What WEe Have 'et to Learn, and the Judicial
and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 739, 748 (1983).
63. McKinnon & WallersteinJoint Custody and the Preschool Child, 4 BEHAVIORAL SC!. &
L. 169, 179 (1986).
64. Id.
65. Id. The study also found that parents agree to share custody for a variety of
reasons other than a genuine wish for a continued close relationship with their children.
These reasons included financial concerns, a limited commitment to parenting, guilt
about initiating the divorce, and fantasies about preserving the marriage. Id. at 172-74,
182.
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to manipulate the parents. 66 One psychiatrist observed of joint
custody:
[I]t increases the chances that they [children] will be used
as weapons or spies in parental conflicts; because no re-
straints are placed on noncooperating parents, such use of
the children is likely. Certainly sole custody arrangements
cannot protect children from this situation, but it does reduce
the opportunities for parents to involve their children in such manip-
ulations.67 Joint custody arrangements are also particularly
vulnerable to disruption when parents establish new
relationships.6
Other studies suggest that; particularly for young children, fre-
quent shuttling from one parental residence to another may conflict
with the child's need for stability and continuity of surroundings. 69
Older children may also find residential "musical chairs" stressful;
changing residences every few days or weeks may disrupt school ac-
tivities, strain friendships, and impair social and recreational activi-
ties. Structure, in other words, is important to children, but
"structure may be shaken by ajoint custody decree."' 70 Finally, chil-
dren simply do better in "harmonious single-parent families than in
intact families with a high level of interparental conflict. '"7 1 The fail-
ure of most courts and legislatures to consider these concerns in
setting joint custody standards may reflect the current emphasis on
joint custody as a parental (particularly a paternal) "right," rather
than as a means of securing the child's best interests after divorce.
66. See Gardner, Joint Custody Is Not for Everyone, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1982, at 7. His
example is, "If you make me turn off the television set, I'm going to go to Daddy's
house!" Id.
67. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). A recent study also suggests that some parents, partic-
ularly those who oppose the divorce, may use joint custody as a way to prolong the
marital relationship, to the detriment of both parents and children. McKinnon & Wal-
lerstein, supra note 63, at 173-74. See also Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Lan-
guage, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 762 (1988)
("Traditional divorce was an emancipatory process that terminated the relationship and
freed lives for rebuilding.").
68. McKinnon & Wallerstein, supra note 63, at 178. For example, one joint custodial
father's passionate attachment for his daughter evaporated when he found a girlfriend,
leaving the child bereft. Id. at 176-77. Of course, this problem can also arise in sole
custody situations.
69. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 36, at 252-53; Steinman, supra note 59, at 408-
13; MillerJoint Custody, 13 FAM. L Q 345, 366 (1979).
70. Levy & Chambers, supra note 57, at 6, 10. Many parents, as well, find extremely
difficult the repeated transitions that joint physical custody entails. McKinnon & Waller-
stein, supra note 63, at 175.
7 1. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 1, at 49 1.
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Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals expressed his
concern this way:
Entrusting the custody of young children to their [di-
vorced] parents jointly .. .is insupportable when parents
are severely antagonistic and embattled .... [Ilt can only
enhance family chaos .... It would, moreover, take more
than reasonable self-restraint to shield the children as they
go from house to house, from the ill feelings, hatred, and
disrespect each parent harbors towards the other.
7 2
In sum, the evidence supports neither court-imposed joint cus-
tody nor a statutory presumption in favor of joint custody. As one
expert has written:
The evidence we currently have does not support a legal
presumption in favor of joint custody, particularly where
parents are in dispute. Rather, a legal presumption would
be based on hope: the hope that the hostility and conflict
between the disputing parents will die down, the hope that
parents can be forced by a court order to cooperate in the
best interest of the child, and the hope that ajoint physical
custody arrangement will still be beneficial to children
under these circumstances.7 3
D. The Questionable End of Stereotypes
Many joint custody proponents speak eloquently of the new
egalitarian marriage in which both parents work, and mothers and
fathers spend equal time caring for children. Unfortunately, this
model does not reflect the reality of most marriages-modern or
otherwise. Studies show that women still spend far more time than
men keeping house and caring for children, even in families where
both parents work.7 4 Women are also far more likely than men to
leave the workplace to care for children, and to work part-time for
72. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 587-89, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1019-21 (1978).
73. Steinman, supra note 62, at 758; see also Wallerstein, supra note 47, at 106; Ester,
Alaryland Custody Law-Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD. L. REV. 225, 258-
59 (1982).
74. See, e.g., S. BECK, THE GENDER FACTORY 7-10 (1985) (extensive empirical evi-
dence shows that husbands participate minimally in household labor and child care, re-
gardless of wives' employment status); Liefland, Career Patterns of Male and Female Lawyers,
35 BUFFALO L. REV. 601, 607-08, 613-17 (1986) (noting that women lawyers continued
to be the primary childcare providers within their families); Pleck, Men s Family Wtork:
Three Perspectives and Some New Data, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 481, 487 (1979) (noting that
although husbands of employed wives have begun to increase their family role, "there is
no question ... that wives continue to hold the primary responsibility for family work.").
See generally Fineman & Opie, supra note 54 (citing studies); Frug, Securing Job Equality for
1988]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:497
childcare reasons. Thus, women are more likely to be both the pri-
mary caretaker 75 and the lower wage-earner in the family. Divorce
rarely alters this pattern; indeed, there is some evidence which indi-
cates that joint custody mothers spend as much time with their chil-
dren as maternal custody mothers.76
Moreover, joint custody is not likely to encourage equal parent-
ing during marriage. Indeed, a rule favoring joint custody is likely
to have the opposite effect.77 A presumption in favor of joint cus-
tody, regardless of which parent has provided care during marriage,
sends a clear message to fathers that they have a right to claim their
children upon divorce-if they choose to exercise that right-no
matter how detached they are from the ongoing care of those chil-
dren during the marriage.78
In marriages where there exists real sharing of parental duties
joint physical custody may be appropriate to reflect that reality.79
The evidence suggests that it is precisely in these situations that par-
ents are likely to adopt a voluntary joint custody plan.80 Even there,
however, a court must be careful to see that it does not let the new
egalitarian stereotype obscure the child's best interests. 8'
W~omen: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55, 56-57 (1979) (same).
Indeed, the continuing responsibility of women for childcare has been identified as
one of the causes of the persistent wage gap between men and women. See Weiler, The
Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1785-87
(1986).
75. At least as between the two parents; schools, grandparents, day care centers, and
housekeepers may also help raise the child.
76. See Lowery, Maternal &Joint Custody: Differences in the Decisional Process, 10 LAw &
HuM. BEHAV. 303, 311 (1986). This study compared various characteristics of couples
entering sole and joint custody arrangements. Because the participants were both few
and voluntary, the results of the study are only suggestive.
77. Of course, rules governing divorce may not influence conduct during marriage at
all. ,
78. Polikoff, 1i'hy Are Mothers Losing: .4 Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 242 (1982).
79. One recent commentator has made the interesting suggestion that states should
adopt a presumption in favor of joint physical custody, with sole legal custody to the par-
ent who was the primary caretaker during marriage. Cochran, The Search for Guidance in
Determnining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint
Custody eferences, 20 U. Ricu. L. REV. I, 47, 53-58 (1985). See infra part V.
80. See Steinman, supra note 59, at 406 (describing characteristics of 24 families who
adopted voluntary joint custody plans). But cf. McKinnon & Wallerstein, supra note 63,
at 172 (finding that desire to nurture child in continuing close contact with both parents
is not the primary motivation for most voluntary joint custody arrangements).
81. How many advocates of joint custody would argue that custody in the more
traditional family (the converse of the new model) should go to the primary caretaker?
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E. The Financial Burden
Joint custody is expensive, at least if done according to the
glowing picture that its advocates usually paint. Seriously shared
physical custody requires two units large enough to house parent
and child on a permanent basis-along with lots of childrearing ac-
coutrements (toys, books, and health items, for example) which
must be present in both units.82 No longer can the child be
crammed into a small apartment, satisfactory for weekend visits but
not for longer stays; instead, each residence has to provide adequate
space for a long-term stay.83
Even more expensive is the need for counseling. On this need,
the experts are emphatic: to work, joint custody requires extensive,
lengthy, and continuous professional counseling.84 That is an expen-
sive proposition.
No doubt the extra financial burden joint custody imposes on
two divorcing partners in a law firm is comparatively small,85 but for
the vast majority of families doing it right is expensive, perhaps pro-
hibitively so."6 Joint custody advocates rarely discuss financial con-
cerns;87 that lacuna is perhaps due to a recognition that most joint
custody arrangements are "joint" in name only.88
82. This would not be necessary if the child stayed in one place and the parents
shifted residences. This scenario is rarely pictured by joint custody advocates.
83. See Patterson, The Added Cost of Shared Lives, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1982, at 10 (c.,,lcu-
lating that joint custody increases "family" costs significantly).
84. See Nestor, Developing Cooperation Between Hostile Parents at Divorce, 16 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 771, 775 (1983); Steinman, supra note 62, at 759-60.
85. One early study found joint custody limited to educated and affluent couples.
Folberg & Graham,joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 523,
562 (1979) (citing Nehls. Joint Custody of Children: A Descriptive Study 7 (1978) (un-
published manuscript)).
86. The financial consequences of joint custody may be particularly devastating for
recipients of federal welfare assistance. For many needy families, eligibility for federal
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits depends upon one parent's
"continued absence from the home." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982). Joint custody may well
jeopardize this eligibility, particularly if the parents share substantial decisionmaking
authority or the child spends time at the home of the nonresidential "joint" custodian.
See Johnson,joint Custody Arrangements and AFDC Eligibility, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 3, 7
(1984).
87. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 310, 508 A.2d 964, 974 (1986).
88. The Internal Revenue Service recognizes this reality. Generally, the parent with
custody during the "greater portion of the calendar year gets the dependency exemp-
tion." I.R.C. § 152(c)(1) (1982). In cases of "split custody," however, physical custody
controls who gets the exemption. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(b) (as amended in 1979). Joint
legal custody, in other words, is irrelevant to the dependency determination.
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F. joint Custody Does Not Increase Child Support
Nor does joint custody-even voluntary joint custody-signifi-
cantly increase compliance with child support awards. Despite pro-
ponents' extravagant claims on this subject, the one systematic
study of custody arrangements and support payments found that the
type of custody arrangement a couple accepts is a far less significant
predictor of support complicance than are factors such as parental
cooperation and the financial resources of the obligor.89 The signif-
icance of those findings is emphasized by the fact that all of the joint
custody families in the study had voluntary joint custody arrange-
ments. The study also showed that even where fathers had joint
legal custody, the mothers with whom the children resided received
full court-ordered support only sixty percent of the time, and even
those payments were frequently late.9 ° These data demonstrate that
joint custody is not an answer to the serious problem of divorced
fathers who fail to comply with their court-ordered support
obligations.
Perhaps more disturbing, the same study suggests that courts
may be using joint custody to justify inappropriately low child sup-
port awards. Courts awarded no child support in more than half of
the cases designated as "joint residential custody," for example, de-
spite the fact that the children in those cases spent on average only
fifty-one weekdays and eighty-four nights per year with one "joint"
custodian. The children, in other words, were living with one par-
ent more than two-thirds of the time, yet that parent was receiving
absolutely no support.9' Labeling an arrangement "joint custody"
also significantly reduced the amount of child support ordered. In
cases of "joint residential custody" where there was a support order,
the amount of visitation averaged only twenty-three weekdays and
fifty-eight overnights a year-not an unusual amount of visitation
for a sole custody decree. The fathers in these "joint custody" ar-
rangements, however, were required to pay only fourteen percent of
their net income in child support; in contrast, the fathers whose for-
mer wives had sole custody paid an average of twenty-six percent of
89. Pearson & Theonnes, Child Custody, Child Support Arrangements and Child Support
Payment Patterns, 36 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49 (1985); see Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their
Relationship to Establishing and Enforcing Support, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 274, 274-75
(1985).
90. Polikoff, supra note 89, at 274. In contrast, mothers who were sole legal and
physical custodians received the full court-ordered support only 45% of the time.
91. Id. at 275.
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their net income." Thus, simply labeling an arrangement "joint
residential custody" reduced both the likelihood and the amount of
court-ordered support, without significantly altering the children's
day-to-day living arrangements.
G. Court-Imposed Joint Custody Improperly Enables Judges to Avoid
Resolving Difficult Custody Disputes
The disappearance of the maternal preference, and the rise of
the no-fault custody decision means that today's judges must make
real decisions when the parents contest custody. Many judges feel
ill-trained to resolve such personal social problems, and others ago-
nize over difficult decisions. Joint custody offers an easy out.93 As
one judge has observed, "Joint custody is an appealing concept. It
permits the court to escape an agonizing choice, to keep from
wounding the self-esteem of either parent and to avoid the appear-
ance of discrimination between the sexes." 94
A child in a custody dispute needs the full protection of the
-court. The parents, generally distraught and in emotional conflict,
may have trouble seeing that their anger and frustration can harm
the child. Moreover, either or both parents may be willing to barter
the child's welfare for their own financial advantage. Society has
placed on the judge the responsibility of seeing that the child's in-
terests are protected. The judge's duty cannot be fulfilled as easily
as joint custody proponents would have it.
Nor should an alleged reduction in litigation, even if true, sup-
port joint custody. Ease of judicial administration is a worthwhile
goal, to be sure, but justice should be the ultimate goal of the judi-
cial system. In the custody arena, that means deciding what is best
for the child. Custody disputes are difficult, and they do require real
decisions, now that the easy rules of thumb are gone.
H. Court-Imposed Joint Custody Distorts the Negotiating Process and
Exacerbates the Danger of Custody Blackmail
Proponents of court-imposed and presumptive joint custody
also fail to consider the detrimental effects of their proposals on the
already lopsided process of divorce bargaining. Recent studies con-
firm what anecdotal evidence has long indicated: divorcing fathers
routinely and successfully use the threat of a custody battle to ex-
92. Id.
93. Gardner, supra note 66, at 8.
94. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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tract damaging financial concessions from their ex-wives during di-
vorce negotiations.95 These concessions encompass child support
obligations as well as alimony demands; they thus contribute sub-
stantially to the impoverishment of divorced women and their
children.
In a recent article, ChiefJustice Richard Neely of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, formerly a practicing domestic re-
lations lawyer, explains how this process of "custody blackmail"
works:
Divorce decrees are typically drafted for the parties after
compromises reached through private negotiation. These
compromises are then approved by a judge, who generally
gives them only the most perfunctory sort of review. The
result is that parties (usually husbands) are free to use
whatever leverage is available to obtain a favorable settle-
ment. In practice, this tends to mean that husbands will
threaten custody fights, with all of the accompanying
traumas and uncertainties ...as a means of intimidating
wives into accepting less child support and alimony than is
sufficient to allow the mother to live and raise the children
appropriately as a single parent. Because women are usu-
ally unwilling to accept even a minor risk of losing custody,
such techniques are generally successful. 96
Recent studies confirm the success of these negotiating tactics.
In an extensive study of divorcing couples in California, one-third of
the divorced women reported that their husbands had threatened to
ask for custody as a ploy in negotiations.9 7 One attorney disclosed
the standard "form letter" used for this purpose:
I could write the blackmail letter by heart (although I ha-
ven't written one in a long time), but this is how it goes:
"Dear Mrs. Jones' lawyer, I received the proposal you of-
fered on behalf of your client, and my client is willing to
agree to everything. Although he would prefer to have cus-
tody of the children, he realizes it is probably not in the
best interest of the children to contest custody. However,
my client is not interested in paying alimony, and if your
client is willing to waive alimony, we would be willing to
accept the proposal which you suggest; if not, then all the
95. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 36, at 310-18; Neeley, supra note 36, at 177-79.
96. Neeley, supra note 36, at 177. These concerns led the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals to adopt a primary caretaker presumption in contested custody cases.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981); see infra part V.
97. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 36, at 310.
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issues will have to be litigated.9"
Legislation skewed toward awards ofjoint custody increases the
ability of the parent requesting joint custody to engage in this type
of extortion. 99 Professor David Chambers has noted that "[a] par-
ent who is not really interested in having joint custody may use the
threat of demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make
concessions on issues of property division and child support."' 0 0
The downside risks of such a strategy are minimal: even if the strat-
egy fails and the husband is "stuck" with joint (legal) custody, he
will not have to assume a major childrearing role.' 0 '
The effect of a joint custody preference on divorce negotiation
is particularly pernicious when that preference is coupled with a
"friendly parent" provision, such as the one found in the proposed
Maryland joint custody bill.'0° A friendly parent provision directs
the court, in awarding sole custody as an alternative to joint custody,
to consider which parent is more likely to allow the children "fre-
quent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent."' 0 3
When only one parent seeks joint custody, the court, pursuant to
the "friendly parent" provision, is likely to favor that parent in a
sole custody award. This reality further increases the risks of oppos-
ing joint custody; not only may the court impose such an arrange-
ment over the opposing parent's objection, but the mere fact of
opposition is likely to diminish her chances of receiving sole cus-
tody. An extraordinary situation is created. A parent who does not
believe that joint custody would be in her child's best interests is put
in the difficult negotiating position of either "accepting" her
spouse's request for joint custody or risking the loss of custody alto-
gether in a contested trial.' 0 4
98. Id. at 224. Other attorneys interviewed said they dismissed such threats as "hot
air" and "posturing." Id.
99. The problems associated with a presumption of'joint custody are canvassed more
fully in Dodson,Joint Custody in Missouri, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. III, 114-15 (1986).
100. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Child Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH L. REv. 477, 567 (1984).
101. Id.
102. S.B. 277, Md. Gen. Assembly, 393d Sess. (1987).
103. Id. at 1916; see Schulman & Pitt, supra note 35, at 554.
104. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 35, at 550-51. In an irony suitable for Solomon, the
parent least fit for custody may benefit most from this type of statute. A parent opposed
to joint custody might be more willing to risk loss of sole custody if she feels that the
other parent is capable of providing satisfactory care for the child. The parent opposed
to joint custody cannot, however, and probably will not, take that risk where the other
parent would not provide minimally sufficient care as a sole custodian. Thus, the less fit
the parent requesting joint custody, the more bargaining leverage that parent gains
under this type of statute. Id.
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IV. JOINT CUSTODY: A SUMMARY
No doubt joint custody can work well. Motivated, caring, and
wealthy parents can manage a true sharing of the children. That
sharing, unaccompanied by strife, may even benefit the children.
But those parents do not need a judicial order to achieve joint cus-
tody; such arrangements can be accommodated easily under the ex-
isting umbrella of sole custody cum liberal visitation rights.'
But joint custody, for the overwhelming majority of families, is
a snare and a delusion. It is wrong to think that joint custody can
work without committed parents, that it is likely to be in the best
interests of the child, or that it will likely result in true sharing of
parenting. Rather, joint custody is all too likely to be another mill-
stone around the neck of the real custodial parent, who will find she
has to share rights (but not responsibilities) with a recalcitrant for-
mer spouse, yet who is likely to find lessened support payments the
real payoff to her of the arrangement. The sincerity of many joint
custody advocates cannot conceal the reality that joint custody cre-
ates many harmful effects, and that a court order cannot overcome
the difficult problems presented by a disintegrating family. Pre-
sumptive joint custody is an idea whose time has come and gone.
V. THE PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE
Opposition to court-imposed or presumptive joint custody
need not be an endorsement of the current rules for resolving cus-
tody disputes. To the contrary, many of the criticisms of the current
system made by joint custody proponents have considerable merit.
But mandatory joint custody is not the answer. More promising is
the limited custody preference in favor of the "primary caretaker
parent" that has been adopted in two states-Minnesota and West
Virginia.' 0 6
The history of the law of custody disputes shows a steady move
from bright line rules to highly discretionary decisionmaking,
105. See Levy & Chambers, supra note 57, at 10. These authors explain:
The parents who are morally committed to sharing the rearing of their chil-
dren, and emotionally able to co-parent, will not require a joint custody order
to do so. They will interact and agree on child rearing issues without violating
an award of custody-both legal and physical-to one parent. If the parents
cannot interact productively, the joint anything will be damaging to a child.
Id. See also Carroll, Ducking the Real Issues of Joint Custody Cases, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 18, 20
(1982) (calling this arrangement "de facto joint custody" and claiming that it often
arises when "the passage of years has eased the pain and anger of the failed marriage").
106. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357 (W. Va. 1981).
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guided only by general principles.'° 7 At common law fathers had an
absolute right to custody of their children.' 8 During the first half of
this century, the paternal preference was replaced by a series of cus-
tody presumptions. The best known was the "tender years" doc-
trine, under which mothers, if fit, were the preferred custodians of
children of "tender years."' 0 9 That doctrine co-existed with a
number of other custody presumptions. In many states fathers were
the preferred custodians for older children10t Moreover, adulter-
ous parents, particularly mothers, were presumed unfit in many ju-
risdictions. " These presumptions simplified judicial
decisionmaking and led to predictable results in most custody cases.
Today, almost all states use a best-interests-of-the-child stan-
dard. I2 That standard has several significant weaknesses. First, it is
indeterminate and speculative.'" 3 Judges must make an individual-
ized prediction about the future-with which parent will this child
be better off in the years to come?" 4 Judges often lack both the
tools and the information to make this prediction with any degree of
confidence. "In the average divorce proceeding intelligent determi-
nation of relative degrees of fitness requires a degree of precision of
measurement which is not possible given the tools available to
judges."' 15
Even if accurate predictions were possible in more cases, our
society lacks any clear-cut consensus about what is "best" for chil-
dren."16 This lack of consensus has led many people to complain
that courts, in applying the best interests standard, simply impose
their personal values on the dispute, a problem exacerbated by the
multitude of factors that judges typically are directed to consider in
ascertaining a child's best interests."'
107. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 233 (1975).
108. Id. at 233-34.
109. Id. at 235. While "tender years" is rarely defined, the age of seven is often cited,
perhaps as a derivation from the first English statute on the subject. See Polikoff, supra
note 78, at 235.
110. Polikoff, supra note 78, at 235.
111. See Ester, supra note 73, at 233-36. Maryland cases for many years recognized a
presumption against an adulterous parent. That presumption was eliminated in Davis v.
Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977).
112. Mnookin, supra note 107, at 236-37.
113. Id. at 229.
114. Id. at 251. This type of prediction differs from most other adjudication, which
requires a determination of past acts and facts.
115. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
116. Mnookin, supra note 107, at 229.
117. For example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the judicial crite-
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Application of the best interests test is also time-consuming and
intrusive. The detailed factual inquiry necessary to determine which
placement will serve a child's best interests is likely to disrupt al-
ready fractured family relationships.s"8 Money that could be used to
ease the transition from joint to separate households is often di-
verted to lawyers, court fees, and expert witnesses.
The best interests test also encourages litigation. Because each
parent can often make plausible arguments why a child would be
better off with him or her, the test creates a greater incentive to
litigate than would a more determinate custody standard." 9 This
increased potential for litigation causes substantial psychological
harm to children.' 0 In addition, the best interests test contributes
to the judicial delay and lack of finality that plague custody law.' 2 '
The indeterminacy of the best interests standard also affects
pre-divorce negotiations. Uncertainty about the outcome of custody
disputes creates the irresistible temptation to trade custody for
lower alimony and child support payments. 22 This uncertainty is
particularly damaging to the primary caretaker parent who may be
willing to sacrifice everything in order to avoid the terrifying pros-
pect of losing custody through the unpredictable process of litiga-
tion. Moreover, it is likely that the primary caretaker, who has
traded career for childraising, will be less able financially to sustain
the expense of a custody fight.' 23
A custody presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent
responds to many of these concerns, without the severe disadvan-
ria for determining a child's best interests include, but are not limited to (1) fitness of
the parents, (2) character and reputation of the parties, (3) desire of the natural parents
and agreements between the parties, (4) potentiality of maintaining natural family rela-
tions, (5) preference of the child, (6) material opportunities affecting the future of the
life of the child, (7) age, health, and sex of the child, and (8) residences of parents and
opportunity for visitation. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md.
App. 406, 419-20, 381 A.2d 1154, 1163 (1978). The Sanders court acknowledged that
"[piresent methods for determining a child's best interest are time-consuming [and)
involve a multitude of intangible factors that ofttimes are ambiguous." Id. at 419, 381
A.2d at 1163. See also Ester, supra note 73, at 226-27 (discussing "the many intangible
factors" that a judge must weigh in determining a child's best interests).
118. Neeley, supra note 36, at 173-77.
119. Mnookin, supra note 107, at 262.
120. Cochran, supra note 79, at 17-20.
121. See Mnookin, supra note 107, at 282. ("Given a hopelessly ambitious standard
that asks the impossible, judges may seek to avoid making an initial determination in a
private custody dispute and may be more willing later to reopen and reconsider an initial
decision.").
122. Cochran, supra note 79, at 14-17; see Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W.
Va. 1981).
123. Garsaa, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
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tages ofjoint custody.' 24 West Virginia and Minnesota have already
adopted such a primary caretaker presumption.125 Under the West
Virginia scheme, the parent who has been the primary caretaker of a
child of tender years is entitled to custody of that child, if he or she
is a fit parent. With respect to older children, who may be able to
form an intelligent opinion about their custody, the rule is more
flexible. A child fourteen years or older may choose his or her cus-
todian if both parents are fit. A judge may also award custody of a
child under fourteen to the parent who was not the primary care-
taker if the child has a "justified desire" to live with that parent, and
the child is old enough to formulate an opinion.' 2 6
The primary caretaker is generally easy to identify. In West Vir-
ginia it is the parent who: (1) prepares and plans the meals;
(2) bathes, grooms, and dresses the child; (3) provides medical care,
including nursing and trips to physicians; (4) arranges babysitting
and after-school activities; (5) puts the child to bed and wakes the
child in the morning; (6) disciplines the child; and (7) teaches ele-
mentary skills such as reading and writing.' 27 Lay testimony can
generally demonstrate which parent performs the lion's share of
these tasks, without lengthy court hearings. 128 Moreover, because
the primary caretaker preference increases the predictability of cus-
tody decisions, the incentives to litigate decrease.
Awarding custody to the primary caretaker furthers a child's
paramount interest in stability and continuity.1 29 It preserves the
124. But see Elster, Solornonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L.
REV. I (1987) (setting forth an interesting attack on both the best interests standard and
the primary caretaker preference).
125. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va 1981); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705
(Minn. 1985). Courts in a number of other states have held that a parent's primary
caretaker status is an important factor to be considered in applying the best interests
test. See, e.g., Gatrix v. Gatrix, 652 P.2d 76, 78 (Alaska 1982) (affirming trial court's
award to mother based largely on her role as primary caretaker and the child's tendency
to look to her as the "primary parent resource"); In re Marriage of Maddox, 56 Or. App.
345, 641 P.2d 665 (1982) (commenting that when other factors bearing on child's best
interests are relatively equal, court will give considerable weight to which parent was the
primary caretaker); Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 448 A.2d 1113 (1982) (indicat-
ing that where natural parents are both fit, and child is of tender years, court must give
positive consideration to parent who has been primary caretaker). See generally Annota-
tion, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child, 4 I
A.L.R. 4th 1129 (1985).
126. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
127. Id.
128. Neeley, supra note 36, at 181.
129. See. e.g.,J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 23, at 31-32 ("Con-
tinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a
child's normal development.").
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child's bond with the parent who has provided daily care and nur-
turing during marriage and continues, to the extent possible, the
childrearing arrangements in effect prior to divorce. S Moreover,
because the primary caretaker has met the child's food, clothing,
and medical needs in the past, that parent is likely to be more famil-
iar with those needs and better able to meet them in the future.' 3
Even if there are some instances in which the non-primary caretaker
would be the better custodian, the exhaustive and destructive hear-
ings necessary-to identify those cases outweigh any marginal bene-
fits gained. ' 3 2
Adoption of a primary caretaker preference also limits the op-
portunities for using child custody as a bargaining chip. A mother
(or father) who has been the primary caretaker during marriage
knows that, if she is a fit parent, she has little chance of losing cus-
tody. She will be less likely, therefore, to bargain away valuable sup-
port rights in order to avoid a custody fight. Conversely, a non-
primary caretaker parent will have less incentive to threaten a cus-
tody fight in order to gain bargaining leverage.' 3 3 The result is that
questions of alimony and child support will be settled on their own
merits, and children will benefit from the increased financial re-
sources available to their custodians.
Although the primary caretaker, even today, is likely to be the
mother, the preference is not discriminatory. Rather, it reflects the
reality that women in most families still bear primary responsibility
for childcare. This is true even in two-career families.' 34 In the un-
usual families where fathers are the primary caretakers of children,
they will benefit from the presumption. Where child care is shared
equally during marriage, neither parent will qualify as the primary
caretaker and neither will be entitled to a presumption. Indeed, in
these families, voluntary joint physical custody may well be a viable
option.
Finally, it is the primary caretaker preference-not court-im-
posed joint custody-that is most likely to encourage true co-
parenting during marriage. Under a primary caretaker regime, par-
ents know that only if they assume substantial parenting responsibil-
130. Cochran, supra note 79, at 34-36; Polikoff, supra note 78, at 241.
131. Cochran, supra note 79, at 34.
132. One well-known commentator, after exhaustively canvassing empirical studies,
developmental theory, and the "practical values that a preference can serve," has en-
dorsed a limited preference for the primary caretaker of children between the ages of six
months and five years. See Chambers, supra note 100, at 561.
133. Cochran, supra note 79, at 36; Neeley, supra note 36, at 180.
134. See supra note 74.
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ities during marriage will they have a realistic chance of gaining
custody at divorce'. 1 5 The impact of the primary caretaker pre-
sumption is thus likely to change as male and female roles within the
family change. When (and if) women and men truly act as co-par-
ents, there will be no primary caretaker, and the presumption will
no longer be useful. But that day has not yet arrived. Until it does,
men who are upset by the thought -of losing custody of their chil-
dren under a primary caretaker regime should begin not by chal-
lenging the legal standard, but by changing their behavior within
the home.' 3 6
135. See Polikoff, supra note 78, at 242-43.
136. Id. at 243.
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